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The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was enacted on October
28, 1998, marking the first changes to the Copyright Act in twenty-two years.
Enactment of the DMCA was prompted by advances in information technology
and the exponential growth of the Internet as the communications medium of
choice. Like any piece of legislation, and perhaps more than most, the DMCA is
the product of legislative compromise. A review of both the changes it makes to
the copyright law and provisions abandoned during legislative compromise
provides great insight into the future of copyright law on the Internet.
Specifically, Title 11 of the Act, the "Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation Act, " responds to concerns of online service providers (OSPs) that
they would be held directly, contributorily, and vicariously liable for the
copyright infringements of their subscribers. In this Note, the author examines
the inconsistent nature of the case law prior to the passage of the DMCA as a
means of demonstrating why such legislation was necessary. Furthermore, the
author argues that judicial attempts at resolving these issues would have been
insufficient due to the courts' demonstrated difflculties applying established
copyright principles to the Internet. Finally, the author outlines the manner in
which specifc provisions of the DMCA address OSP concerns.
I. INTRODUCTION
The features which distinguish the Internet terrain from that of all other
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debate, embodied in Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
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media are the same features which make the Internet fertile ground for copyright
infringement. The Internet has given individuals the power to reproduce and
transmit virtually every type of copyrightable work1 inexpensively and almost
instantaneously. Because of the ease with which words, music, and images can
be copied and transmitted cheaply and anonymously through cyberspace,2 works
published3 on the Internet are exposed to a great risk of being used in an
unauthorized manner. Copyright infringement on the Internet manifests itself in
many forms. Infringement can occur when an individual user simply
"downloads" copyrighted material from a web site. On the other end of the
spectrum, the infringement may be the primary purpose of a business.4 Once
1 Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this tile, in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (1)
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). The current copyright law is codified at title 17 of the United States
Code.
2 "Cyberspace" is a popular term for the seamless web of electronic communications over
computer networks. See Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 993, 994 (1994) (discussing various issues affecting online service providers).
The term "cyberspace" was coined by science fiction author William Gibson in his 1984 novel
Neuromancer. See WiLLIAM GmSON, NEuROMANCER 51 (1984); see also William S. Byassee,
Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 198 n.5 (1995) (stating that, in Gibson's vision, cyberspace was a
"consensual hallucination that felt and looked like physical space but actually was a computer-
generated construct representing abstract data") (quoting EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO
MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW: YOUR RIGHTS AND DUTmS IN THE ON-LINE WORLD
(1994)).
3 "Publication" is defined as:
The distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer
of ownership,, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or
phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public
performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance or display
of a work does not of itself constitute a publication.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
4 For example, for-profit retrieval companies like CARL Corp. and Information Access
have, in the past, typed or electronically scanned in a published piece, uploaded it to a database,
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online copyright infringement 5 is alleged, the question becomes-whom, in
addition to the direct infringer, should the copyright owner seek to hold liable?
Specifically, what ought to be the liability of the online service provider (OSP)
for acts of infringement by users of the service? This question has elicited
numerous responses-in the forms of inconsistent court opinions, a report of a
Presidential task force, and proposed legislation in the House and Senate. It
remained unanswered until October 28, 1998-the date the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA)6 was signed into law.7
and then charged customers for each "hit" (i.e., online retrieval). See Edwin Diamond &
Stephen Bates, Law and Order Comes to Cyberspace, TECH REV. (Ocr. 1995) (visited Apr. 4,
1999) <http://www.techreview.com/articles/oct95/ Diamond.html>.
5 For a discussion of the elements of copyright infringement, see infra notes 26-39 and
accompanying text.
6 Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 1-505, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
7 The DMCA's five Titles make several major changes to the existing copyright law. Title
I, the "WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) Copyright and Performances and
Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 1998," implements two 1996 international
intellectual property treaties, see DMCA §§ 101-105, affording "writers, artists, and other
creators of copyrighted material global protection from piracy in the digital age." See Statement
by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 2281, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
2168 (Nov. 2, 1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 645, 677. Title I adds new sections 1201
and 1202 to the Copyright Act, prohibiting individuals from gaining unauthorized access to a
copyrighted work by circumventing a technological protection measure put in place by the
copyright owner. See DMCA § 103 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)). To "circumvent
a technological protection measure" is to "descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an
encrypted work, or otherwise avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological
protection measure." DMCA § 103 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)). Title II,
discussed herein, establishes limited liability of Online Service Providers (OSPs) for copyright
infringement. See DMCA §§ 201-203. Title III, the "Computer Maintenance Competition
Assurance Act," reverses the Ninth Circuit in MAISys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d
511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993), by providing that it is not an act of copyright infringement for a
computer owner to make or authorize the making of a copy of a computer program solely for
the purposes of computer maintenance or repair. See DMCA §§ 301-302. Title IV contains six
"Miscellaneous Provisions," including one which exempts ephemeral recordings from
copyright infringement under certain conditions and expands the 1976 Act's fair use exemption
for libraries and archives. See DMCA §§ 401-407. Finally, Title V, the "Vessel Hull Design
Protection Act' (VHDPA), by creating sui generis protection for boat hull designs, effectively
overrules the United States Supreme Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141 (1989) (striking down, as preempted by federal patent law, a Florida statute that
protected from copying boat hull designs, which in and of themselves, did not qualify for
patent protection). See DMCA §§ 501-505. Contrary to popular belief, the Act does not
provide blanket protection for designs. Moreover, databases remain unprotected by the
copyright law. However, such review is beyond the scope of this Note.
The 105th Congress's involvement in the copyright arena does not end with the DMCA.
One day prior to the DMCA's enactment, October 27, 1998, President Clinton signed into law
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The college student who, without permission, uploads8 copyrighted music
onto the Internet and the student who downloads 9 it are direct infringers.10
However, the owner of the copyright in the music faces two obstacles in
proceeding against such individuals. First, it may be difficult to pinpoint the
identity of the direct infringer. Second, even if the direct infringer is located, it is
unlikely that such individual will have the "deep pockets" necessary to satisfy a
judgment. Because the Copyright Act imposes joint and several liability I for
copyright infringement, the most promising option for the copyright owner
would appear to be to employ a direct, contributory, or vicarious liability theory
to reach the "deep pockets" of OSPs. 12
S. 505, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). Title I, the "Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act," extends by twenty years the duration of all copyrights. See id. § 102. Thus, the
duration of copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, is extended from life of the
author plus 50 years to the life of the author plus 70 years. See id. Additionally, the Act
provides that works for hire and anonymous or pseudonymous works are subject to terms of 95
years from the date of first publication or 120 years from date of creation, whichever expires
first. See id. The copyright term extension provisions became effective immediately. For a
general discussion of the duration of copyright protection, see SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND
TRADEMARK 131-39 (1999). Title II of S. 505, the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998,"
amends § 110(5) of the 1976 Act by expanding the rights of certain businesses and restaurants
to provide background music without paying royalties. See Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827.
8 "Uploading" refers to the transfer of information from an Internet user's personal
computer to the Internet. See Karen S. Frank, Potential Liability on the Internet, 437 PLI/PAT
417,425 (1996) (providing a glossary of Internet terminology).
9
"Downloading" refers to the transfer of information from the Internet to an Internet
user's personal computer. See id.
10 For a discussion of direct infringement, see infra Part lI.B.l.
11 See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
12 An OSP may also be referred to as an "Intemet Access Provider" or an "Internet
Service Provider" (ISP) in the literature, and the terms are often used interchangeably. The
terms "Internet Access Provider" and "Internet Service Provider" generally refer to companies
which provide the tool, by licensing proprietary software and leasing access to computer
facilities to subscribers, that allows subscribers to access the Internet (e.g., Netcom Online
Communication Services). See Frank, supra note 8, at 422. In contrast, the term "Online
Service Provider" generally denotes a content provider, whether it be a web page provider or
an operator of a Bulletin Board Service (BBS). See id.
A web page is a digital information site programmed in the computer language HTML
which allows users to move directly from that site to another, through the use of highlighted
text. This highlighted text indicates that the Web page is linked to another page or Web site,
which includes information of the same matter. See id.
A BBS may, but need not be connected to the Internet. A BBS could be a single personal
computer with a few transmission lines or a larger service like CompuServe, which provides
[Vol. 60:755
DIGTAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
Prior to the enactment of the DMCA, the few federal court opinions which
addressed OSP liability attempted to apply traditional copyright principles of
vicarious and contributory liability. Offering little guidance to future courts
eagerly in search of precedent as they sought to apply the existing copyright law
to an environment characterized by changing technology, these courts reached
divergent and sometimes confusing conclusions. Further, OSPs feared that the
Ninth Circuit's expansive treatment of contributory and vicarious liability in the
non-Intemet case of Fonovisa, Inc. v. Chery Auction, Inc.13 would be adopted in
cases in which they faced the possibility of liability for the infringing activities of
their subscribers.
The release of The White Paper,14 the first articulation by any presidential
administration regarding the relationship between intellectual property law and
the Internet, spurred additional, divergent approaches to the problem of OSP
copyright infringement liability. While OSPs supported legislative efforts to
minimize their liability, critics of such legislation believed it would eliminate any
incentive for OSPs to discourage copyright infringement on their systems.' 5
Most commentators agreed that a delicate balance must be struck which
provided protection of copyrights in cyberspace without stunting the Internet's
growth,16 but it is at this point that the opinions diverged.
both closed host content and access to the Internet. A BBS operator can "upload" (transfer
information from one's personal computer to the BBS system) content to the BBS so that its
subscribers may access the information. See id. at 423.
Because many services like America Online and Prodigy provide both connective (access)
and content-based services, they are referred to as "hybrid services." These hybrids may create
databases which can only be accessed by their subscribers. See id. Strictly speaking, the term
"ISP" would not refer to "hybrid" services such as America Online, and thus, this Note uses
"OSP" as a catch-all term referring to connective, content-based, and hybrid services.
13 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
14 See INFORMATION INFRASTRuCrURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECruAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCruRE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTs (1995) [hereinafter The White Paper]. Single copies of The
White Paper may be obtained, free of charge, by sending a written request to: 'Intellectual
Property and the NII," Office of Legislative and Intemational Affairs, U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, Box 4, Washington, D.C. 20231. The report may also be downloaded from
the IITF Bulletin Board at <http://iitf.doc.gov>.
15 See Daniel R. Cahoy, Comment: New Legislation Regarding On-line Service Provider
Liability for Copyright Infringement: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, 38 IDEA 335, 335
(1998) (arguing that the current copyright regime and the attendant body of common law
provides an adequate basis upon which the courts may rely, and, as a result, a dramatic change
in the Copyright Act exempting online service providers from liability, in the words of The
White Paper, is-at best-premature).
16 See Joseph Levi, Will Online Service Provider Liability Unravel the Web?, 477
PLI/PAT 547, 547 (1996) (discussing steps OSPs may take to minimize their infringement
1999]
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Prior to the enactment of the DMCA, the issue-should OSPs be held liable
for the infringements of their subscribers-remained unresolved. In Part II, this
Note provides a basic introduction to the law of copyright specifically, the
theories of copyright infringement liability. Part IMI examines how the copyright
law was applied before the DMCA's enactment with particular emphasis on the
probable impact of Fonovisa's expansion of contributory and vicarious liability
theories. In Part IV, this Note outlines earlier Congressional attempts to legislate
an exemption for OSPs and reviews criticisms levied against these proposals.
Part V responds to these criticisms, arguing that without such legislation, the
imposition of infringement liability on OSPs would impact disastrously upon the
future of the Internet. In Part VI, this Note explains how the DMCA's limitations
on liability or "safe harbors," address OSP concerns. From this analysis, this
Note concludes that the scope of the DMCA remains unclear-as the courts have
yet to apply the safe harbors in their infringement analyses.
H-. THE ROAD ALREADY TRAVELED: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
A. Copyrightability
Copyright is a property right which exists in "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression."17 Section 102 of the Copyright Act
sets forth three conditions for copyrightability: "[F]irst a work must be fixed in a
tangible form; second, the work must be an original work of authorship; and
third, it must come within the subject matter of copyright." 18
1. Fixation and Attachment
"[A] work [is] considered 'fixed in a tangible medium of expression' if there
has been an authorized embodiment in a copy or phonorecord and if that
embodiment 'is sufficiently permanent or stable' to permit the work to be
'perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated' for a period of more than
transitory duration." 19 There is little controversy in establishing fixation of
information transmitted across the Internet. Works which have been transmitted
online have been held to be sufficiently fixed and thus, entitled to protection
under copyright law.20
liability in the absence of a statutory liability limitation).
17 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
18 Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668
(7th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted).
19 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
20 See Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 931-32 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Courts
[Vol. 60:755
DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRGHT ACT
2. O0rinality and Creativity: The Minimal Threshold2'
The Seventh Circuit has declared that "[t]he requirement of originality
actually subsumes two separate conditions, i.e., the work must possess an
independent origin and a minimal amount of creativity. A work is original if it is
the independent creation of its author. A work is creative if it embodies some
modest amount of intellectual labor."22
3. The Subject Matter of Copyright
Not only must a work be fixed in a tangible medium of expression and possess a
minimum degree of creativity and originality to obtain copyright protection, but
also it must fall within a category of copyrightable works. Section 102(a) of the
Copyright Act lists the categories of copyrightable works, which include: (1)
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3)
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural
works.23 Copyright owners who feel their exclusive rights are being infringed
may seek to hold someone liable under one of the three theories of copyright
infringement liability.
have so held even though the House Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act states that
the definition of fixation would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transitory
reproductions such as those captured momentarily in the memory of a computer. See H.L REP.
No. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
Such Interet transmission necessitates the creation of files. See Frank, supra note 8, at
427. For example, an e-mail file remains at the POP (Post Office Protocol) Server for the
addressee's Intemet service provider until it is retrieved by the addressee. Even after the e-mail
is read and deleted by the addressee, the e-mail message remains on the access provider's
system until new information is "written" on top of it. See id. Sending a message to a Usenet
newsgroup which caused the reproduction of portions of a copyrighted text on the storage
devices of a BBS and an Intemet access provider was found to create "copies" for purposes of
the Copyright Act of 1976. In Religious Tech. Cr., Inc. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995), the court noted that even though the
messages remained on OSPs' systems for at most a period of eleven days, they were
sufficiently "fixed" to constitute copies. See id. at 1368; see also, The White Paper, supra note
14, at 66.
21 See SHELDON W. HALPERN ET AL., COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALs 56 (1992).
22 Baltimore Oioles, 805 F.2d at 668; see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (stating that the originality/creativity requirement is a
constitutional prerequisite to copyrightability).
23 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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B. The Three Theories ofLiability for CopyrightInfringement
Subject to the exemptions and limitations detailed in sections 107 through
120, the Copyright Act gives a copyright holder the exclusive rights to, or license
anyone to: (a) reproduce the copyrighted work; (b) prepare derivative works; (c)
publicly distribute copies of the copyrighted work; (d) publicly perform the
copyrighted work; and (e) publicly display the copyrighted work.24 A copyright
is infringed when someone violates any of these exclusive rights of the copyright
owner.25 Such direct infringement is but one form of liability; theories of
vicarious and contributory infringement can extend liability beyond the direct
infringement.
1. Direct Infingement
In order to prevail in a suit for direct infringement of a copyright, the
plaintiff must prove (1) ownership of a valid copyright26 and (2) a defendant's
violation of one of plaintiffs exclusive rights.27 Direct infringement does not
require intent or any particular state of mind,28 although knowledge is relevant to
24 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. For a detailed discussion of "the copyrights," see HALPERN Er
AL., supra note 7, at 66-112.
25 See 17 U.S.C. § 501. The term "copying' is sometimes used as "shorthand for the
infringing of any of the copyright owner's five exclusive rights." S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc.,
886 F.2d 1081; 1085 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989).
26 A certificate of registration from the U.S. Copyright Office is prima facie evidence of
the validity of a copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
27 See Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988); Baxter v. MCA,
Inc., 812 F.2d 421,423 (9th Cir. 1987).
28 The strict liability for copyright infringement imposed by the Copyright Act contrast
with another area of law in which OSPs faced liability--defamation. Until the enactment of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), there was a split in the courts regarding the
liability of OSPs for defamatory statements published on their sites. A recent decision held that
where a BBS exercised little control over the content of the material on its service, it was more
like a "distributor" than a "republisher" and thus was only liable for defamation occurring on
its system when it knew or should have known of the defamatory statements. See Cubby, Inc.
v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); cf. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that Prodigy
was a "publisher" because it represented itself as controlling the content of its services and
because it used software to automatically prescreen offensive messages). The CDA resolved
the debate in favor ofno liability for OSPs by adding the safe harbor provision found in section
509 of the CDA. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (Supp. II 1996); see also Jose I. Rojas, The Internet
and Content Control. Liability of Creators, Distributors and End-Users, 471 PLI/PAT 203,
212 (1997) (comparing OSP liability for defamation and copyright infringement and correctly
predicting that, after years of court battles and intense lobbying, Congress would adopt a
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the award of statutory damages.29 Thus, a defendant can be found liable for
direct infringement regardless of whether or not he or she knew that the actions
violated one of the plaintiff's exclusive rights. 30
Online users who "upload" copyrighted material to the Internet or a BBS
may be direct infringers. However, because these users tend to have more
shallow pockets than OSPs, the more lucrative action for a copyright owner
seeking damages for pre-DMCA infringement of copyright was often to proceed
against an OSP under a contributory or vicarious liability theory.
2. Contributory Infingement
Although it is not recognized specifically in the Copyright Act, "the concept
of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of
identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another." 31 In order to prevail in a suit for
contributory infringement of a copyright, the plaintiff must establish, in addition
provision (similar to the CDA's safe harbor) shielding OSPs from copyright infringement
liability). The CDA's safe harbor provides: "No provider or user of interactive computer
services shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
29 Statutory damages allow for a recovery in the amount of "not less than $500 or more
than $20,000" per infiinging occurrence. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1); see, e.g., Playboy Enterps.,
Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1177 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (awarding $500 for each
of 620 occurrences for a total of $310,000 against operators of a web site where copying of
plaintiff's copyrighted works continued after issuance of a preliminary injunction). In a case in
which a court finds that infringement was willful, the award may be increased to a sum of not
more than $100,000. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). However, if the court finds that the defendant
was an "innocent infringer," one with no reason to believe his conduct constituted an
infringement, an order may be issued to reduce the award to a sum of no less than $200. See id.
Because actual damages can be difficult to prove, plaintiffs may elect to receive statutory
damages instead. Statutory damages are awarded by the trial court in an amount "that appears
to be just." Id. § 504(c)(1). For a further discussion of factors courts consider when fashioning
an award, see HALPERN ET AL., supra note 7, at 165-66.
3 0 See D.C. Comics Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1990) (illustrating that a
finding of innocent infringement does not absolve defendant of liability).
31 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (noting
that the origin of contributory liability lies in the tort law notion that one who knowingly
participates in or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the primary
tortfeasor). In Sony, a seminal case in copyright law, Universal Studios sued Sony Corporation,
alleging that Sony's sales of Betamax videotape recorders contributed to individuals'
unauthorized copying of Universal's copyrighted programs. In holding that Sony's sales of
Betamax recorders did not constitute contributory infringement, the United States Supreme
Court enunciated the "substantial, noninfringing uses" exception to contributory infringement
liability. See id. at 442.
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to the underlying direct infringement, that (1) the defendant had the requisite
knowledge32 of the infringing activity, and (2) the defendant "induc[ed],
caus[ed], or materially contribut[ed] to the infringing activity" 33 of the direct
inflinger.34 Contributory infringement liability may also be based on the
provision of services or equipment related to the direct infringement.35
3. Vicarious Infringement
Although contributory infringement liability focuses on the defendant's
relation to the direct infringement vicarious infringement liability focuses on the
defendant's relationship to the direct infinger. In order to prove vicarious
infringement liability, the plaintiff must establish, in addition to the direct
infringement, that the third party defendant (1) had the right and ability to
supervise or control the direct infringer and (2) received a direct financial benefit
from the infringement of the copyrighted work.36
3 2 The knowledge element is objective. That is, the alleged contributory infringer must
know or have reason to know that a direct infringement is occurring. See Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Prod. Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (1 1th Cir. 1990); see also
Sony, 464 U.S. at 487 (stating "it is sufficient that the defendant have reason to know that the
infringement is taking place").
33 Cable/Home, 902 F.2d at 845.
34 See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1163 (2d Cir. 1971). In Gershwin, the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP) sued Columbia for copyright infringement arising out of a public
performance of 'Bess, You is My Woman Now," at a for-profit concert sponsored by a local
community association without the permission of Gershwin. The Second Circuit held that
Columbia's participation in the formation, direction, and programming of the community
concert association placed it in a position to police the conduct of the artists. Thus, Columbia
was found liable for contributory infringement.
3 5 See supra note 31. For a discussion of the application of contributory infringement
liability to OSPs, see infra Part 1I.B and Part IUD.
3 6 See William 0. Ferron et al., On-line Copyright Issues: Recent Case Law and
Legislative Changes (Part l), 14 No. 2 COMTUTER L. (Feb. 1997). Vicarious liability is an
outgrowth of the agency principle ofrespondeat superior. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (noting that respondeat superior imposes liability
on an employer for the copyright infringements of its employee). Shapiro and Bernstein,
owners of copyrights in several musical compositions, alleged that H.L. Green Co. Department
Store was vicariously liable for the infringing activities of concessionaires selling bootleg
records at the store. The Second Circuit found H.L. Green vicariously liable, reasoning:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious direct financial interest
in the exploitation of copyrighted materials-even in the absence of actual knowledge
that the copyright monopoly is being impaired, the purposes of copyright law may best be
effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of the exploitation.
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The doctrine of vicarious infringement liability was developed in the
landlord-tenant/dancehall-performer cases. Courts repeatedly hold that a landlord
is not vicariously liable for the infringing activities of a tenant if (1) the landlord
leased the property without notice of any upcoming infringement, (2) at a fixed
rental rate, and (3) did not exercise any supervision over the tenant 37 Similarly,
in the dancehall cases, owners of nightclubs and lounges have been found
vicariously liable for the infringing activities of musical acts who perform at
their premises because of their overall ability to supervise the music which is
performed and because they receive a "direct financial benefit" from
performances which "draw" customers into the club, thus creating revenue.38
However, there are "dancehall cases" in which nightclub owners have been
found not liable because they do not obtain a direct financial benefit from the
infringing activities occurring within their establishments. 39 A nightclub owner
getting a percentage "cut" from the cover charge for a performance at which
infringing music is played receives a direct financial benefit from infringing
activity. If the nightclub act attracts customers who then purchase alcoholic
drinks from the nightclub owner's bar, the nightclub owner receives an indirect
financial benefit.
These cases indicate that the greater the degree of control the owners or
proprietors exercise over those using their facilities, the more likely a court is to
find that such owners satisfied the first prong of the vicarious infringement
liability test. Additionally, the landlord/dancehall cases demonstrate that if the
owners or proprietors receive only a flat rental fee for the use of their
"establishments"' facilities, it is highly unlikely that they will be found to have
any "financial interest" in the infringing conduct occurring on the premises.
However, if the infringing activity directly creates increased attendance and/or
sales for the owners or proprietors of the establishments, a court is likely to find
that they received a financial benefit and satisfied the second prong of the
vicarious infringement liability test.
Id. (citations omitted).
3 7 See Frank, supra note 8, at 429; see, e.g., Duetsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir.
1938).
38 See, e.g., Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355
(7th Cir. 1929).
3 9 See, e.g., Roy Export Co. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350, 1353
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that the defendants were not vicariously liable because the entrance
fee was paid to the performer and the performer paid only a flat fee to the owner of the
establishment).
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IH. TERRA INCOGNITA: PRIOR TO THE DMCA, ONLINE SERviCE PROVIDER
LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT WAS LARGELY UNDEFINED
Prior to enactment of the DMCA, one commentator referred to liability
for copyright infringement online as "terra incognita" 40-- unknown land. Very
few decisions addressed OSP infringement liability, and those that did failed to
clarify the application of traditional copyright concepts to the Internet terrain.41
Rather, courts addressing the issue of OSP copyright infringement liability
reached inconsistent conclusions. An examination of the pre-DMCA cases
demonstrates that the law lacked clarity and was threatened by the judiciary's
misapplication of traditional copyright concepts-illustrating the need for
legislative guidance.
A. Direct Copyright Infringement Liability of OSPs
1. The Playboy Case
The first reported decision in which a court confronted the issue of copyright
infringement liability online was Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,42 in which
it was held that a BBS operator could be liable for publicly distributing or
displaying copies of copyrighted works uploaded by its subscribers. The
defendant operated a BBS upon which fee-paying subscribers could upload and
download erotic photographs, one hundred and seventy of which were
copyrighted Playboy images.43 The defendant BBS operator claimed that he was
unaware that the Playboy copyrights were being infringed on his system, even
though he maintained files entitled "Playboy" and "Playmate."44 The court
granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff, finding the defendant liable
for direct copyright infringement of Playboy's exclusive rights of public display
and distribution because he "supplied a product [to his subscribers] containing
unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work."45 Noting that knowledge is only
relevant to the issue of the amount of statutory damages,46 not liability,47 the
40 See Frank, supra note 8, at 421.
41 See id. at 421-22.
42 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
43 See id. at 1554.
44Id.
45 Id. at 1156. It should be noted that the court did not conclude that the BBS operator had
violated the plaintiff's reproduction right. See id.
46 For a discussion of statutory damages, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
47 See Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
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court rejected Frena's defense that he was unaware of the infringement.
2. SegaI
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MIPI-A (Sega )48 illustrates that, without
legislative guidance, courts were likely to confuse the doctrines of direct and
contributory infringement liability when applying them to questions of OSP
liability. In this case, the OSP was a BBS operated by the defendant which
contained copyrighted video games owned by Sega. The defendant solicited its
fee-paying subscribers to upload Sega's copyrighted video games to the BBS and
sold "copiers" which facilitated the making of unauthorized copies of the Sega
games. 49 The Sega I court held that a prima facie case of direct copyright
infringement had been established because "unauthorized copies of [Sega's]
games are made when such games are uploaded to the MAPIA bulletin board,
here with the knowledge of Defendant Scherman [the BBS operator]. These
copied games are thereby placed on the storage media of the electronic bulletin
board by unknown users."50 In other words, the court found that a BBS operator
is liable for direct infringement when its users make copies on its BBS.
Consequently, the court issued a preliminary injunction against the defendant.51
Sega _Ps reference to the "knowledge of Defendant" was troublesome.
Though knowledge is not a necessary element of a direct infringement claim, the
court's direct infringement holding stressed that the uploading and downloading
of Sega games was "particularly known" to the BBS operator who "specifically
solicited the copying and expressed the desire that [the] video game programs be
placed on the MAPHIA bulletin board for downloading purposes. '52 The Sega I
court's apparent misunderstanding of the difference between direct and
contributory infringement made even more apparent the need for a legislative
solution to guide the courts in their application of copyright infringement liability
doctrines to OSPs.
3. Netcom
Fearing the widespread application of a strict liability standard for direct
infringement signaled by Playboy, OSPs embraced the direct infringement ruling
in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communication Services,
48 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
49 See id. at 683-84.
50 Id. at 686-87 (emphasis added). The Sega Idecision was rendered on plaintiff's motion
for a preliminary injunction.
51 See id. at 689.
52 Id. at 683.
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Inc.53 In Netcom, representatives of the Church of Scientology sued Dennis
Erlich, a former Scientology minister turned vocal critic of the Church, for
copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets. The Church
alleged that Erlich infringed their copyrights when he made several postings to
the "Usenet ' '54 newsgroup "alt.religion.scientology" which contained excerpts of
L. Ron Hubbard's copyrighted works.55 Erlich admitted "copying" but argued
that his use of the works was a fair use.56 On September 22, 1995,57 the court
53 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
54 The Usenet has been described as a "worldwide community of electronic BBSs that is
closely associated with the Internet." DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS
196 (1994). The messages in Usenet are organized into thousands of topical groups called
"newsgroups." Usenet users read and contribute ("post') to their local Usenet site. Each local
site distributes its users' postings to other Usenet sites and receives postings from other sites.
Usenet is read and contributed to on a daily basis by millions of people. There is no specific
network that constitutes the Usenet. Instead, Usenet traffic flows over a wide range of
networks, including the Internet and dial-up phone links. See id. at 196-97.
5 5 SeeNetcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
56A copyright owner's exclusive rights to reproduce, display, and distribute a
copyrighted work are limited by the "fair use" defense. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The
defense 'permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when,
on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."' Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). Specifically, § 107 states that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section,forpurposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (emphasis added). Balancing the four factors during its consideration of
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the Netcom court found that "the percentage of
plaintiffs' works copied combined with the minimal added criticism or commentary negates a
finding of fair use." Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Serv., Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 1231, 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1995). For an in-depth discussion of the fair use defense, see
HALPERN ETAL, supra note 7, at 115-31.
57 After issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO) against all defendants without
providing them with advance notice, the court dissolved the TRO against Netcom and
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rejected Erlich's fair use defense and granted a preliminary injunction against
him58
The Church also named Tom Klemesrud, the operator of the BBS to which
Erlich subscribed, and Netcom, the access provider that enabled Klemesrud to
connect to the Internet, as defendants in both direct and conlributory copyright
infringement claims.59 The Church alleged that Netcom was liable for direct
copyright infringement because Erlich's postings remained on its server for a
period of time.60
On November 21, 1995, the Netcom court found that Klemesrud's posting of
unauthorized copies and Klemesrud's and Netcom's storage and retransmission
of the infringing copies on their respective computer systems uploaded by an
infringing user did not constitute direct infringements6' of the exclusive rights of
reproduction, public distribution, or public display.62 Interestingly, the court
Klemesrud. See Religious Tech. Ctr., Inc. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., No.
C-95-20091 RMW, 1995 WL 86532, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1995).
58 See Netcom, 923 F. Supp. at 1258.
59 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1361. For a discussion of Netcom's contributory
infringement analysis, see infra Part IIIJ3.
6 0 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp at 1367-69.
61 See id. at 1373, 1381-82. Usenet's structure was an important element influencing
Netcom's direct infringement holding. See supra note 54. Erlich accessed the Intemet by using
a personal computer and a modem in his home to connect to defendant Klemesrud's BBS, to
which Erlich was one of 512 subscribers paying an annual fee. Klemesrud's BBS was
connected to the Internet though a subscription with Netcom which allowed Klemesrud to
lease access to the Interet at a fixed rate. The Netcom court described the basic process that
occurred when Erlich posted his messages to the "alt.religion.scientology" newsgroup as
follows:
Erlich connects to Klemesrud's BBS using a telephone and a modem. Erlich then
transmits his messages to Kiemesrud's computer, where they are automatically briefly
stored. According to a prearranged pattern established by Netcom's software, Erlich's
initial act of posting a message to the Usenet results in the automatic copying of Erlich's
message from Klemesrud's computer onto Netcom's computer and onto other computers
on the Usenet In order to ease transmission and for the convenience of Usenet users,
Usenet servers maintain postings from newsgroups for a short period of time-eleven
days for Netcom's system and three days for Klemesrud's system. Once on Netcom's
computers, messages are available to Netcom's customers and Usenet neighbors, who
may then download the messages to their own computers. Netcom's local server makes
available its postings to groups of Usenet servers, which do the same for other servers
until all Usenet sites worldwide have obtained access to the postings, which takes a matter
of hours.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
62 Thus, Netcom distinguished MAISys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,518
(9th Cir. 1993), which found direct infringement of the reproduction right where the
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stated that a finding of direct infringement liability required "some element of
volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used
to create a copy by a third party,"63 even though the 1976 Act imposes direct
liability without regard to intent.64 The Netcom court concluded that:
It does not make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of countless
parties whose role in the infringement is nothing more than setting up and
operating a system that is necessary for the functioning of the Internet.... The
court does not find workable a theory of infingement that would hold the entire
Internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be deterred.65
4. Sega II
In 1996, a second opinion in the Sega case (Sega Df) granted plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment.66 Sega if is understood to have endorsed,
adopted, and potentially expanded the Netcom analysis.67 Stressing that
Sherman, the BBS operator, did not upload or download the infringing files
himself, the Sega if court stated that Sherman could not be liable for direct
infringement because he did not directly cause the copying.68 Instead, the Sega if
court found the BBS operator liable for contributory infringement because (1) he
knew that BBS subscribers were copying the Sega software, and (2) his
operation of the BBS constituted "substantial participation' in the direct
infringements. 69
5. Frank Music
In Frank Music v. CompuServe Inc.,70 plaintiffs (a purported "class" of
music publishers) alleged that CompuServe was directly liable for the acts of its
defendant's employee had personally loaded the copyrighted softvare into RAM. See Netcom,
907 F. Supp. at 1368-70.
63 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370 (noting that Netcom's failure to remove Erlich's postings
from its system upon receipt of notice was not sufficient to constitute an act of volition).
64 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
65 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372 (emphasis added).
6 6 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
67 See Jeffrey P. Cunard & Albert L. Wells, The Evolving Standard of Copyright Liability
Online, in LIGATING COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETrTION CAsES 1997, at
365, 382 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. G-497, 1997).
68 See Sega 1, 948 F. Supp. at 932.
69 See id. at 932-33.
70 No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
[Vol. 60:755
DIGITAL MfLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
subscribers, who had uploaded to and downloaded from a CompuServe Forum
sound recordings of the publishers' copyrighted musical compositions.
Reportedly, CompuServe settled the case by agreeing to pay a royalty71
reflecting the number of times each one of plaintiff's songs was downloaded
through its network.72 The terms of the settlement and licensing arrangement
suggested a method in which OSPs may minimize their liability for the
infringing acts of their subscribers. The agreement was "structured to reflect the
CompuServe business model, in which content areas ('Forums ' ) are managed
by independent contractors ("Forum Managers") who select, edit and assume
responsibility for the content of the Forums. '73 Thus, it was the responsibility of
the Forum Managers, not CompuServe itself, to obtain licenses from the Harry
Fox Agency.74 The settlement agreement specifically stated that "CompuServe
assumes no subsequent liability... for allegedly infringing downloads from a
Forum unless CompuServe had actual knowledge that licensable music files
were being uploaded to that Forum."'75
Based upon this analysis of the few reported OSP direct infringement cases,
it is clear that, without legislative guidance, a court could have gone either way
on this issue. A copyright owner would argue that Sega I and Playboy
demonstrate that the strict liability standard should be applied to OSPs. However,
OSPs would argue that Netcom and Sega H require some evidence of volition,
even though it is not an element of a direct infringement claim. The Playboy and
Sega I decisions prompted OSPs to "believe that their industry was facing a crisis
arising from the application of the strict liability standard. Content owners,
conversely, viewed the Internet and online services as presenting a crisis for
them: a cheap and universal medium for the unauthorized copying and
distribution of their works." 76 Prior to enactment of the DMCA, OSPs defending
a direct infringement claim would have hoped that the court hearing the action
71 The royalty was paid to Frank Music's agent, the Harry Fox Agency.
7 2 See Howard Siegel & David J. Stein, Music Performance Rights on the 'Net.
Continuing Uncertainty Over Cybercasting, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1997, at S4; see also
CompuServe Settles a Suit on Copyright Infringement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1995, at B 11.
73 Cunard & Wells, supra note 67, at 381-82. For further discussion of the terms of the
settlement, see id. (written by attorneys for the law firm which represented clients in the case).
747Te Harry Fox Agency was established in 1927 as a subsidiary of the National Music
Publishers' Association (NMPA) to license copyrighted musical compositions for use in, inter
alia, commercial records, tapes, and CDs; audiovisual works including motion pictures and
cable television programs; and TV and radio advertising. Currently the Agency represents
more than 20,000 music publishers. See About HFA (visited Mar. 27, 1999)
<http://vww.nmpa.orgnfa.html>.
75 Cunard & Wells, supra note 67, at 381-82.
7 6 Id. at 372.
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would rely upon the Netcom decision instead of Playboy or Sega I. Now OSPs
can rest easy in the knowledge that section 512(a) of the DMCA essentially
codifies Netcom.77
B. Contributory Infringement Liability of OSPs
Netcom78 illustrated that the prerequisites for contributory infringement
liability are the same online as they are offline-knowledge plus substantial
participation.79 In regard to the first prong of the contributory infringement test,
the court refused to grant Netcom's motion for summary judgment, ruling that
Netcom could be liable as a contributory infringer if plaintiffs could prove that
Netcom knew that the infringing material resided on its system.80
On the second prong of the contributory infringement test, the Netcom court
followed the traditional model in holding that a defendant might be liable for
contributory infringement if the defendant, with knowledge of the infringing
activity, "'induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
the primary infringer," and that participation is substantial.81 The court noted
that Netcom's "providing a service which allows for the automatic distribution of
all Usenet postings, infringing and non-infringing," raised a triable question of
fact as to whether Netcom substantially aided Erlich in accomplishing his
purpose of publicly distributing the postings by not removing the infringing
content from its system. 82 Further, the court found plaintiffs pleadings sufficient
77 See infra Part VI.A.
78 For a discussion of the facts of Netcom, see supra Part mA.3.
79 See supra Part II.B.2; see also Cunard & Wells, supra note 67, at 379.
80 The court noted that because Erlich's infiinging activity continued after Netcom
received notice of the infringement claim, there may be a question of fact as to whether Netcom
knew or should have known that Erlich's activities were infringing. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Netcom countered that it should not be liable under any theory of liability because its use
constituted a fair use. The Netcom court found that a question of fact regarding the fair use
defense remained, in light of the evidence that Netcom knew Erlich's use was infringing, that
Netcom's copying was not for commercial purposes, and that questions remained regarding the
effect of Erlich's copying on the market for L. Ron Hubbard's works. See id. at 1380-81. For a
discussion of the fair use analysis, see supra note 56.
81 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
82 See id. at 1375. Further, the court noted that it would be "fair" to hold Netcom liable
because it did not relinquish control over how its system was used. Netcom had, in the past,
suspended the accounts of subscribers who violated its terms and conditions. Additionally,
Netcom admitted that it might be able to screen postings coming from a particular individual,
such as one suspected of infringing copyrights. See id. at 1375-76.
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to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Klemesrud knew or should
have known of Erlich's infringing activities and still induced, caused, or
materially contributed to Erlich's infringing conduct.83 Netcom provided
minimal guidance for subsequent courts facing similar contributory infringement
inquiries-these remaining questions of fact were never resolved because the
case settled in August of 1996.84
C. Vicarious Infringement Liability of OSPs
In their efforts to avoid vicarious copyright infringement liability, OSPs
attempted to analogize their businesses to the landlord cases, arguing that, just as
landlords do not have the right or ability to control the conduct of their tenants,
OSPs do not have the right and ability to control the conduct of their
subscribers.85 Additionally, OSPs argued that they did not satisfy the second
prong of the vicarious liability test because a fixed subscriber fee is similar to the
fixed monthly rent a landlord receives from his tenant, and thus, does not
constitute a direct financial benefit.
In Netcoin, plaintiffs sought to hold Netcom vicariously liable by virtue of its
relationship with Erlich, arguing that Netcom had the right and ability to control
its users' postings before they occurred. Plaintiffs pointed to Netcom's subscriber
agreement-which stated that Netcom reserved the right to take remedial action
against its subscribers, specifically prohibited copyright infringement, and
required that its subscribers indemnify Netcom for any damage to third parties-
as evidence of Netcom's right to control the conduct of its subscribers. 86 Netcom
argued that OSPs can be analogized to common carriers like the phone company
and maintained that, as a mere passive conduit of Erlich's messages, it did not
and could not screen Erlich's messages for infringing content before posting
them to the BBS.87 Though it found there was a genuine issue of material fact as
83 See id. at 1382.
84 See Mark Walsh, Netcom Settlement Could Help Forge Internet IP Policy, THE
RECORDER, Aug. 6, 1996, at 1. Reports indicate that the settlement "required Netcom to post a
warning to its subscribers not to use the Netcom service for unlawful transmission of
copyrighted materials" and "reportedly required Netcom to establish a written procedure for the
handling of future complaints of copyright violation" Cunard & Wells, supra note 67, at 380.
85 See, e.g., Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. For a discussion of the landlord-
tenant/dancehall-performer models of vicarious infringement liability, see supra Part II.B.3.
86 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375-76.
87 Netcom's counsel argued that holding a mere conduit liable for copyright infringement
occurring on its facilities would be like holding the owner of a highway or toll booth liable for
the criminal activities that occur on its roads. See id. at 1369, n.12. Moreover, Netcom argued
that the speed and volume of messages transmitted across the Interet rendered an OSP unable
to exercise editorial control over the messages. See id. at 1376.
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to the control prong, the court dismissed plaintiffs' vicarious infringement claim
against Netcom on summary judgment.88 The court reasoned that plaintiffs'
failure to allege that Klemesrud received any financial benefit was fatal to their
vicarious infringement claim against Klemesrud.89
The White Paper concluded that "if an entity provided only the wires and
conduits-such as the telephone company, it would have a good argument for an
exemption if it was truly in the same position as a common carrier and could not
control who or what was on its system."90 However, OSPs are not bound to carry
all the traffic that one wishes to pass through them, as is true with the usual
common carrier. The Netcom court noted that section 111 of the Copyright Act
codifies an exemption for passive carriers who otherwise would be liable for a
secondary transmission provided that the carrier does not have any direct or
indirect control over the content or selection of the transmission.91 Finally, the
Netcom court concluded that Netcom did not fall within this statutory exemption
and thus faced the usual strict liability scheme of the 1976 Act. It noted that it
was for Congress, and not the courts, to carve out an exemption for OSPs. 92
D. Expanding the Boundaries of Contributory and Vicarious Infringement
Liability for OSPs?: Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.
Because Netcom ended in settlement, the issue of what constituted
participation substantial enough to support a claim for contributory infringement
remained unresolved. The expansion of contributory and vicarious infringement
boundaries in the recent Ninth Circuit decision of Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cheny
Auction, Inc.93 appeared likely to have a serious impact upon OSP liability.
Fonovisa, owner of copyrights and trademarks in Latin/Hispanic music
recordings, sued Cherry Auction swap meet, its manager Pilegard, and individual
owners W.D. and Margaret Mitchell for contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement. The defendants operated a swap meet in Fresno, California, where
8 8 See id. at 1376-77.
8 9 See id. at 1382 (explaining that the complaint did not allege that Klemesrud's fee
varied in any way with the content of Erlich's postings, nor did it allege that Klemesrud
profited in any way from allowing Erlich to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights). The court thereby
rejected plaintiffs' indirect financial benefit argument-that although Netcom charged its
subscribers a fixed fee, its "policy of refusing to take enforcement actions against its
subscribers and others who transmit infringing messages over its computer networks" attracted
copyright infringers to its system. See id. at 1377.
90 The White Paper, supra note 14, at 122.
91 See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.12 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 11 l(a)(3) (1994)).
92 See id.
93 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
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counterfeit recordings of Fonovisa's music were sold by independent vendors
who set up booths at the swap meet.94 Though the district court found Cherry
Auction not liable,95 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
1. Contributory Infringement
The knowledge element of the contributory infringement claim was
undisputed, as plaintiffs had demonstrated that the defendants were aware that
plaintiff's copyrights were being infringed because the sheriff's department had
executed previous raids at the auction, seizing thousands of counterfeit
recordings.96 As to the disputed second prong of the contributory infringement
test, the court found that Cherry Auction's provision of space, utilities, parking,
advertising, plumbing, and customers, "materially contributed" to the direct
infringement of the individual vendors.97 The Fonovisa court noted that
"[i]ndeed it would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place in the
massive quantities alleged without the support services provided by the swap
meet."98 Possibly even more alarming to OSPs was the Fonovisa court's
adoption of the Third Circuit's analysis in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v.
Aveco, Inc.,99 that "providing the site and facilities for known infringing activity
is sufficient to establish contributory liability."' 100
2. Vicarious Infringement
The Fonovisa court also held that the plaintiff adequately stated a claim for
94 Seeid. at 261.
95 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
9 6 See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261. On December 12, 1991, the sheriff's department raided
the auction and seized over 38,000 counterfeit recordings and arrested twenty-seven people.
The defendants were notified of the raid and its results. On October 19, 1992, the sheriff
discovered that the counterfeit sales were continuing. A follow-up letter from the sheriff to
Cherry Auction manager Pilegard noted that several vendors abandoned their booths when he
arrived and reminded Pilegard of his promise to cooperate with the authorities to obtain the
names, addresses, and vehicle license numbers of the vendors. See Fonovisa, 847 F. Supp. at
1494. The court concluded that, because defendants refused to comply, they were liable for
protecting the identities of the direct infringers. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. Then, on January
9, 1993, a Fonovisa investigator observed similar sales. One day after serving defendants with
a complaint in this action, more counterfeit sales were documented. See Fonovisa, 847 F. Supp.
at 1494-95.
97 See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
98 Id. (emphasis added).
99 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
100 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
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vicarious liability against the Cherry Auction "marketplace owners." The court
held that the control prong was satisfied because the "marketplace owners"
patrolled the vendors during the swap meet and organized the event. The court
viewed Cherry Auction's reservation of the right to terminate the vendors at any
time for any reason as evidence of this control. 101 As to the second prong of the
vicarious liability test, the court held that the defendants benefited financially by
receiving fixed daily rental fees paid by each infringing vendor, and rejected the
defendants' argument that a financial benefit could accrue only if the
"marketplace owner" earned a commission (a percentage of proceeds received
from sales of the infringing tapes). Additionally, the court emphasized that
Cherry Auction received financial benefits in the forms of admission fees,
parking fees, and proceeds from food sales that "flow directly from customers
who want to buy [the bootlegs] at bargain basement prices" even though the fees
were not directly tied to the sale of the tapes.102 In so holding, the Fonovisa court
demonstrated that the financial benefit received by a vicarious infringer can be
direct or indirect.103
3. Fonovisa's Potential Impact Upon OSP Liability
From the moment the decision was issued, commentators recognized that
Fonovisa could greatly affect OSP liability.10 4 "Never before had third-party
infringement liability been assigned to a party so disconnected from the actual
infringer or the infringement." 10 5 Fonovisa's broad definitions of the substantial
participation prong of the contributory liability test and financial benefit and
control prongs of the vicarious liability test would be favorable to "plaintiffs who
seek to reach out and touch someone [here, an OSP] in a meaningful, financial
101 See id. at 262-63.
102 See id. at 263.
103 This holding comports with the legislative history of the Copyright Act. See S. REP.
No. 94-473, at 57 (1975); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659, 5775.
104 See David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 34 n.142 (1996) (stating that Fonovisa 'provides a liberalization of the
standards for vicarious liability in' cyberspace"); see also David Goldberg & Robert J.
Bernstein, Contributory Liability for Swap Meets, Internet Providers, N.Y.L.J, May 17, 1996,
at 3.
105 Kenneth A. Walton, Is a Website Like a Flea Market Stall? How Fonovisa v. Cherry
Auction Increases the Risk of Third-Party Copyright Infingement Liability for Online Service
Providers, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 921,924 (1997) (arguing that while the Fonovisa





Fonovisa required only a minimal contribution of materials and labor to find
contributory liability. A court applying Fonovisa to the Internet terrain might
have found that providing subscribers basic access to their Internet services
(whether it be merely providing Internet access or providing specific content)
constituted a sufficient amount of "material contribution" to satisfy the second
prong of the contributory infringement test. The analogy has been drawn that the
"material contribution" provided by the Cherry Auction owners and operators-
"space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and customers" is little more
than what an indoor shopping mall might provide its tenants. 107 Thus,
commentators feared that an application of the Fonovisa analysis to the Internet
context rendered the "substantial participation" prong of the contributory
infringement test almost meaningless.10 8
David Nimmer warned that applying vicarious infringement liability to
OSPs invites "massive lawsuits... suffocating the Net through the blind flailing
of pre-cyberspace principles."'1 09 In a vicarious infringement action against an
OSP, a plaintiff might analogize OSPs to a "marketplace owner" because they
too derive a financial benefit from the subscriber fees they charge their users.
Fonovisa would not require that the plaintiff prove that the presence of infringing
material on the OSP's system increased traffic on its system, because it noted
that the financial benefit could be direct or indirect. According to Walton, such
an analysis would do away with the accepted notion that a landlord with no
personal stake in the profits resulting from an infringement is not vicariously
liable.1 10 Further, Fonovisa established that the "financial benefit prong can be
satisfied by gains that are theoretical, unquantifiable, minor, and remotely related
to the infringement."111 One commentator put the issue into perspective, stating:
"A shopping mall may benefit financially from customers attracted by a popular
tenant. Should this make the mall jointly and severally liable for tenant copyright
infringement, if it could be argued that the infiinging tenant attracted customers
with the popularity of an infringing item?"1 12
Moreover, plaintiffs could use Fonovisa to argue that OSPs exercise control
over the activities of their subscribers. OSPs generally enter into contractual
10 6 Morgan Shipman, Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
10 7 See Walton, supra note 105, at 943.
108 See id.
10 9 Nimmer, supra note 104, at 34.
110 See Walton, supra note 104, at 943; see also supra notes 36-39 and accompanying
text.
111 Walton, supra note 105, at 943 (citing Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 104, at 3).
112 1d. at 943.
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agreements with their subscribers, much like the swap meet operators did with
the individual vendors, which allows the OSP to terminate a subscriber's account
at any time. This relative ease with which the marketplace operator of Fonovisa
could be analogized to an OSP made it likely that future courts would apply
Fonovisa's broad interpretations of contributory and vicarious infringement to
the Internet context.1 13
IV. CHARTING THE COURSE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PROPOSALS TO
CLARIFY OSP LIABILrY FOR COPYRIGHT NINGEMENT
A. Attempts to Achieve Certainty Through Legislation
Whether justified or not in believing that later courts would not follow
Netcom and Sega I114 OSPs feared that Playboy, Fonovisa, and Sega I would
be used as precedent justifying increased liability on their part for the infringing
activities of their subscribers. Arguing that the enormous amount of traffic on the
Internet made it unfeasible for them to police the activities of their subscnbers,
OSPs sought to clarify their standard of liability. It is against this uncertain
backdrop that amendments to the Copyright Act, which culminated in the
passage of the DMCA, were proposed.
1. House Bill 2180 and Senate Bill 1146-Predecessors to the Act
House Bill 2180 was introduced in the House on July 17, 1997, by
Representative Howard Coble from North Carolina.1 15 That bill, the Online
Copyright Liability Limitation Act (OCLLA), proposed to add a new section 512
to the Copyright Act which would exempt OSPs from direct or vicarious liability
when the OSPs had merely acted as passive "conduits" for Internet users so long
as the OSP:
(A) did not initially place the infiinging material online;116
(B) did not generate, select or alter the content of the material; 17
(C) did not determine who will receive the material;
113 See id. at 944.
114 See Cunard & Wells, supra note 67, at 385 ("W[]o begin with the obvious, the
opinions of two district court judges in Northern California are far from controlling upon the
rest of the federal judiciary.").
115 See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997).
116 This provision was ultimately enacted as section 202 of the DMCA. See DMCA, Pub.
L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860,2877-2878 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1)).
117 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(2)-(5)).
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(D) did not receive any direct financial benefit from the particular act of
infringement;
(E) did not sponsor, endorse or advertise the infringing material; and
(F) (i) did not know or was not aware by notice or other information indicating
that the material is infringing or (ii) was prohibited by law from accessing the
material that causes suspicion and made no further inquiry or took no further
action.118
House Bill 2180 conditioned its exemption from direct or vicarious liability upon
the OSP having no knowledge of the copyright inflingement, which,
traditionally, is not an element under either theory. Further, should an OSP
escape direct or vicarious liability, it could still be found liable for contributory
infringement. However, section 512 (a)(2) would have limited the available
remedy for contributory infringement to injunctive relief which is "technically
feasible and economically reasonable to carry out."119 The House version's
subparagraph (F) used the scienter standard of "did not know" and "was not
aware," which avoided creating an affirmative duty for OSPs to monitor material
posted online.120
In contrast, Senate Bill 1146121 contained a "notice and take-down"
provision, which provided that OSPs are not liable if they "take down" the
infringing material "expeditiously" upon notice from the copyright owner. 122
Title I of Senate Bill 1146 was broader than House Bill 2180 in that it addressed
not only the liability of "service providers," but also provided three blanket
exemptions from copyright liability for unauthorized transmission of copyrighted
content. Senate Bill 1146 exempted (1) providers of network facilities (including
118 See H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. § 512(aX1)(A)-(F) (1997).
119 Id.
120 See H.R 2180, 105th Cong. § 512(a)(1)(F) (1997); see also Hearings Held on Online
Service Provider Bill, 9 No. 10 J. PRoPRIErARY RTs. 24, 24 (October 1997).
121 Senate Bill 1146, the Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act
of 1997, or, alternatively, the Technology for Educators and Children (TECh) Act, was
introduced by Senator John Ashcroft from Missouri on September 3, 1997. See S. 1146, 105th
Cong. (1997).
122 Specifically, Senate Bill 1146 would have exempted the operator of an electronic
communications network from copyright liability arising from content stored on its network if
it removed or blocked access to such content within ten days of receiving notice of the
infringement. See id. § 512(b)(1). Senate Bill 1146 detailed the information which must
accompany such notices, including proof of copyright registration and a specific description of
the content and its location on the operator's network. Further, Senate Bill 1146 required that
the notice must include a payment to the operator in an amount prescribed by the Register of
Copyrights (for the purpose of deterring frivolous and de minimis claims) and a sworn
statement attesting to the accuracy of the information in the notice. See id. § 512(b)(3); see also
Cunard & Wells, supra note 67, at 390.
1999]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
"intemet access providers" and "OSPs"); (2) providers of e-mail services, "real-
time communication" formats such as chat rooms, streaming data, and other
virtually simultaneous transmissions; and (3) providers of site-linking aids or
directories, including hyperlinks and navigational aids such as search engines
and browsers. 123 Unlike Senate Bill 1146, House Bill 2180 indicated that an
OSP's receipt of fees from subscribers did not constitute a direct financial benefit
of an infringing act and therefore, would not subject the OSP to vicarious
infringement liability. 124
Following the introduction of House Bill 2180, the Judiciary Subcommittee
on Courts and Intellectual Property held two legislative hearings on the bill and
Representative Bob Goodlatte of Virginia spent months negotiating with OSPs,
telephone companies, libraries, universities, and copyright owners. 125 These
efforts resulted in the substitute House Bill 3209.
2. House Bill 3209
More recently, House Bill 3209,126 'The On-line Copyright Ifingement
Liability Limitation Act" (OCILLA)12 7 was introduced as a substitute for House
123 See S. 1146 § 512(a). For a discussion of logical access providers including search
engines, see infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
124 See 143 CoNG. REc. E1452-53 (daily ed. July 1, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coble); see
also Bill Would Clarify Online Provider Liability for Copyright Infringement, 14 No. 10
COMpUTER LAW. 24 (Oct. 1997).
125 See 144 CONG. REc. E160 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Coble).
126 H.R. 3209, 105th Cong. (1998).
127 The full text of House Bill 3209 and other bills, as well as bill summaries and status
reports, may be found at <http.//thomas.loc.gov>. House Bill 3209 proposed to add the
following section 512 to the Copyright Act of 1976:
(a) LIMITATION-Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, a provider shall not
be liable for-
(1) direct infringement, based solely on the intermediate storage and transmission
of material over that provider's system or network, if-
(A) the transmission was initiated by another person;
(B) the storage and transmission is carried out through an automatic
technological process, without any selection of that material by the provider, and
(C) any copy made of the material is not retained longer than necessary for the
purpose of carrying out that transmission;
(2) monetary relief under [§] 504 or 505 for contributory infringement or vicarious
liability, based solely on conduct described in paragraph (1); or
(3) monetary relief under [§] 504 or 505 for contributory infringement or vicarious
liability, based solely on transmitting or providing access to material over that provider's
system or network, other than conduct described in paragraph (1), if the provider-
(A) does not know and is not aware of information indicating that the material
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Bill 2180 on February 12, 1998 by Senator Howard Coble in an attempt to codify
the Netcom 128 decision. On February 26, 1998, the House Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property passed the bill unanimously. However, the bill
passed by the Subcommittee did not represent a finished product. Subcommittee
members indicated that serious issues had still to be addressed at the full
Committee level.129 Ultimately, compromise was reached and is now embodied
is infringing; and
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity.
(b) PROTECTION OF PRIVACY-Nothing in subsection (a) shall authorize or obligate
a provider to access material that the provider is prohibited by law from accessing, or
impose an affirmative obligation to monitor or otherwise seek information indicating
infringement.
(c) LIMITATION BASED UPON REMOVING OR DISABLING ACCESS TO
INFRINGING MATERIAL-A provider shall not be liable for any claim based on that
provider's removing or disabling on-line access to material, in response to knowledge or
information indicating that the material is infringing, whether or not the material is
infringing.
(d) OTHER DEFENSES NOT AFFECTED-Removing or disabling access to material
which a provider transmits on-line or to which a provider provides online access, or the
failure to do so, shall not adversely bear upon the consideration by a court of a defense to
infringement asserted by that provider on the basis of section 107 or any other provision
of law.
(e) MISREPRESENTATIONS-Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents
that material on-line is infringing shall be liable for any damages, including costs and
attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer or by any copyright owner or copyright
owner's authorized licensee who is injured by such misrepresentation, or by any provider
who relies upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material
claimed to be infringing.
(f) DEFINITION-As used in this section, the term 'provider' means a provider of on-
line services or network access.
(g) CONFORMING AMENDMENT-The table of sections for chapter 5 of title 17,
United States Code is amended by adding at the end the following: '512. Limitations on
liability relating to material online.'
H.R. 3209, 105th Cong. (1998).
128 For an in depth discussion of Netcom, see supra Part IIIA.3 (regarding direct
infringement liability); Part Ill.B (regarding contributory infringement liability); and Part III.C
(regarding vicarious infringement liability).
129 See Jonathan Band, Congress Makes Little Progress on New Intellectual Property
Bills, 4 No. 6 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 9, 10 (1998). Given that the Intemet knows no
boundaries, it is clear that the issue of OSP liability is not confined to the United States alone.
The international scope of OSP liability was addressed at the December 1996 World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Diplomatic Conference in Geneva. See Cunard &
Wells, supra note 67, at 387. It was understood on Capitol Hill that the fate of House Bill 3209
was inextricably linked to that of House Bill 2281, the World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty Implementation Act
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in Title I of the DMCA, the WIPO Treaties Implementation Act
House Bill 3209 distinguished between direct infringement and "secondary
liability." Representative Coble explained that House Bill 3209 essentially
sought to codify Netcom, 130 eliminating direct infringement liability of OSPs for
mere "storage" and "transmission" of infiinging material, provided that the
transmission consisted of "automatic acts engaged in through a technological
process initiated by another." 131 Further, knowledge would be immaterial. As to
"secondary liability," House Bill 3209 would change the 1976 Act in two
respects. First, no monetary relief would be available for passive, automatic acts
identified in Netcom. Second, House Bill 3209 would clarify the current criteria
for contributory and vicarious infringement liability and make them somewhat
more difficult to satisfy. Additionally, Representative Coble stressed that
injunctive relief would still remain available, ensuring that copyright owners
could secure the cooperation of OSPs who had the capacity to prevent ongoing
infiingement. 132
of 1997 (WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act). See H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1997).
House Bill 2281, which was approved by the Subcommittee on the same day it approved
House Bill 3209, proposed to add a new section 1201 to the Copyright Act, prohibiting the
manufacture or import of products that circumvent technologies that (1) restrict unauthorized
access to a copyrighted work or (2) prevent unauthorized copying of a work. Proponents of the
bill, including the motion picture and recording industries, contended that, given the ease with
which copying may be accomplished on the Intemet, the only way to prevent piracy on the
Intemet is to prohibit the manufacture and use of circumvention products. VCR and personal
computer manufacturers, libraries, and other opponents of WIPO asserted that the provision
could prohibit multipurpose devices such as personal computers and VCRs which could
circumvent while performing other functions. Such an enactment, they argued, would
effectively overtum the "substantial non-infringing uses" exception to contributory
infringement liability created by Sony. These opponents argued for a statute which prohibits
circumvention only if its purpose is infringement. See Band, supra. For further discussion of
the international aspects of OSP liability, see Jeffrey P. Cunard & Jennifer B. Coplan, WIPO
Treaty Implementation: Debate Over OSP Liability, 14 No. 6 COMPurER L. STRATEGIST 1
(1997).
13 0 See 144 CONG. REC. E160 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Coble).
131 Id. Senator Coble explained:
In doing so, it [House Bill 3209] overrules those aspects of the ... (Playboy) case,
inasmuch as that case might apply to service providers, suggesting that such acts could
constitute direct infringement, and provides certainty that Netcom and its progeny, so far
only a few district court cases, will be the law of the land.
Id. Recall that in Playboy, the district court for the Middle District of Florida held a BBS
operator directly liable for publicly distributing or displaying copies of copyrighted works
uploaded by his subscribers. See supra Part III.A.1.
132 See 144 CONG. REC. E160 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Coble).
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Section 512(b) was added in response to OSPs' concerns that their
monitoring of content could lead to liability for tortious invasion of privacy.
Further, section 512(c) exempted a provider from any claim based on an OSP's
removing or disabling online access to material in response to knowledge or
information that such material is infringing, whether or not such material was in
fact an infringement. However, in an effort to deter false claims, section 512(e)
made liable any person who knowingly materially misrepresents that online
material is an infringement.
B. Skepticism Concerning the Needfor a Legislative Response: "A
Solution in Search of a Problem?"133
1. Arguments Against a Legislative Guide
Critics argued against the need for legislation limiting the liability of OSPs
for copyright infringement. 134 On September 16 and 17, 1997, at the hearings of
the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, Jack Valenti of the
Motion Picture Association of America argued against House Bill 2180 and
Senate 1146 stating that "[i]n the few cases where liability has arisen, existing
fair use and infringement law have generally been applied to find OSPs not liable
for infringements by network users."'135
Alternatively, critics of the statutory exemption argued that shielding OSPs
from copyright infringement liability would remove any incentive for them to
keep the Internet free of infringing content. These critics suggested that search
engines and directory pages that feared contributory liability might require web
pages to guarantee that their pages are free from infringing content before that
index would list their site. Additionally, search engines and directories might
require that the individual web pages indemnify them against liability they might
incur. Moreover, in the absence of a statutory exemption, web page operators
would have an incentive to keep their pages free from infringing content and
fewer web pages might be willing to link to an infringing web page-ultimately
rendering the infringing web page less effective in disseminating its content.136
133 See Cahoy, supra note 15, at 335.
134 See, e.g., id. at 354 (arguing that a change to the 1976 Act would be "premature");
Walton, supra note 105, at 946 (arguing that, despite the dangers posed by Fonovisa,
legislation was unnecessary).
135 Hearings Held on Online Service Provider Bill, 9 No. 10 J. PROPR=TARY RTS. 1997,
at 24.
136 See Levi, supra note 16, at 562-66.
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2. The White Paper
Opponents of a statutory exemption for OSPs from copyright infringement
liability relied on The White Paper 137 for support. In 1993, President Clinton
formed the Information Infrastructure Task Force (iITF) "to articulate and
implement the Administration's vision for a National Information Infrastructure
(Ni)."'1 38 To further this effort, the Working Group on Intellectual Property
Rights, chaired by then Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks Bruce Lehman, was established to examine the impact
of the NII upon intellectual property rights and policy.139 On September 5, 1995,
the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights issued their final report,' 40
The "White Paper," which focused on "the application of the existing copyright
law and to recommend only those changes that are essential to adapt the law to
the needs of' the Internet community. 141
The White Paper directly disagreed with Netcom's holding that BBS
operators are not directly liable for the infringing acts of their subscribers.
Therefore, critics argued that The White Paper also disapproved of House Bill
3209, inasmuch as that bill was an attempt to codify Netcom.142 Recognizing that
the full potential of the NIl "as a true, global marketplace" would not be realized
if the content protected by intellectual property laws was not protected when
disseminated via the NII, The White Paper advocated that the enforcement of
copyright protection for works published online was "essential" to the success of
the NI 1 4 3 Thus, The White Paper concluded that the best way to protect an
author's rights was to hold OSPs liable for the infringing activities of their
subscribers, even absent intent to infringe, stressing that this approach was
consistent with the strict liability standard of the Copyright Act.144
Further, The White Paper argued that providing a statutory exemption for
OSPs would remove the incentive for OSPs to reduce the chances that their users
13 7 See supra note 14.
138 The White Paper, supra note 14, at 1. According to The White Paper, the Internet as
we know it today is a prototype for the NIl, which is envisioned as a high-speed, interactive,
digital communications system that will integrate the nation's computers, telephones,
televisions, radios, and fax machines. See id. at 8, 179.
139 See id. at 2.
140 The preliminary draft of The White Paper, released on July 7, 1994, is referred to as
"The Green Paper." See id. at 3.
141 Id. at 5-6.
142 See supra Part IV.A.2.
143 See id. at 16; see also Levi, supra note 16, at 551.
144 See id. at 116-22. The White Paper relied heavily upon Sega I and Playboy in
reaching its conclusion.
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would infringe copyrights, and ultimately increase the resulting damage to
copyright holders. The White Paper provided several justifications for its
proposal. First, it argued that such liability should be viewed as a cost of doing
business because OSPs attract subscribers and increase their profits by providing
users the capability of uploading works to and downloading works from their
systems. 145 Further, The White Paper suggested that OSPs are in a better
position than authors to reduce the occurrences of copyright infringement by
educating their subscribers, shifting responsibility for infringement to their
subscribers through indemnification and warranty agreements, purchasing
insurance, and developing technological solutions to eliminate infringing
material. 146
V. TRAVELING WITHOUT A MAP: A LOOK AT THE FUTURE OF OSP
LIABILriY HAD THE DMCA NOT BEEN ENACTED
The White Paper concluded that "it is-at best-premature" to craft
legislation aimed at reducing "the liability of any type of service
provider... ."147 The White Paper assumed that the "[i]mplementation of
preventative measures, compliance with the law, and development of
technological mechanisms to guard against infringement" could not be achieved
if legislation limiting OSP infringement liability was adopted.148 I believe that
the two interests are not mutually exclusive. A statute can be, and was, crafted
that balances the interests of OSPs and copyright owners and ensures the
continued growth of the Internet as the communications medium of choice for
those who wish to publish their messages easily, inexpensively, and almost
instantaneously. Of course, any attempt to clarify OSP liability through
legislation needed to heed the warning of the House Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property.149 The legislation must be broad enough to enable
courts to adapt it to the ever-changing technological landscape.
Unrestrained, misguided, and inconsistent application of cases like Fonovisa
could have had a disastrous impact upon the future of the Internet. Placing
liability for contributory and vicarious infringement onto OSPs would have
impacted upon their ability to organize information and increase the cost of their
14 5 Seeid. at 117.
14 6 See id. at 123.
147 Id. at 122. The White Paper reached this conclusion when the Frank Music and
Netcom cases were pending. See id. at 121-22.
148 See id. at 124.
149 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
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services to users.150 The threat of liability might have deterred web sites, OSPs,
and logical access providers from using hyperlinks. 151 The less often hyperlinks
are used and the fewer logical access providers who are willing to take such
risks, the more difficult it would become for Internet users to navigate the Web.
Ultimately, the Internet may have ceased to be a "seamless web" of
interconnected documents-thereby substantially decreasing its utility.
Moreover, OPSs would have been forced to internalize the costs they
incurred defending copyright infringement claims and satisfying judgments
against them.152 These increased "costs of doing business" might ultimately have
forced many web pages, logical access providers, and OSPs out of business.
Smaller operations would have been the first to disappear, and ultimately, larger
services might have obtained a monopoly, further raising prices for Internet
users.
Other critics of Fonovisa's expansive view of contributory and vicarious
infringement liability noted the threats the opinion posed to OSPs. One
commentator emphasized that courts must articulate that a web site is not like a
swap meet in order to avoid haphazard application of Fonovisa to OSPs. Further,
the author asserted that OSPs should not be found to satisfy the "financial
benefit" prong simply because some infringement is occurring on their systems.
The author's recommendation continued:
Unless an OSP is clearly profiting from infringement; by either receiving a share
of infringement profits or by receiving a large percentage of income from users
who seek access to infringing material, it should not be held vicariously liable.
Additionally, when determining whether an OSP is liable for contributory
infringement courts should carefully consider whether the "control" prong is
truly satisfied. For an OSP, the ability to terminate a user for say, discourteous
15 0 See Walton, supra note 105, at 945-46.
151 See id. Hyperlinks aid Web surfing. As one commentator explained:
A hyperlink is a reference included in a source document to a point in a destination
document. The link is established by incorporating the address of the destination
document into the source document. Visually, hyperlinks appear on a web page as either
an icon or text displayed in a distinguishing way. When a user clicks on the hyperlink
with a mouse, the user's browser software loads the hyperlink address and automatically
accesses the destination web page whose contents are transmitted to the user's computer
screen.
Levi, supra note 16, at 560.
152 See Walton, supra note 105, at 946. At the September 16 and 17 hearings on House
Bill 2180, Roy Nel, president and CEO of the United States Telephone Association, supported
the need for such legislation, stating that "the potential for massive lawsuits" and the difficulty
OSPs have in detecting infringement justified legislative action on the issue of OSP liability.
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behavior, is not the same as the ability to stop all copyright infringement1 53
Yet, the author concluded that "OSPs do not need new statutes or novel legal
doctrines to protect them. Instead, existing case law should be applied very
carefully."' 154 However, I submit that this "mapping" should not have been left
up to the courts, which might apply the existing law inconsistently, drawing
minute distinctions among different types of OSPs. Rather, the legislative
solution is most appropriate.
VI. THE LEGISLATIVE MAP: CONGRESS ANSWERS OSP CONCERNS WITH
TITLE II OF THE DMCA
Congress's answer to the possible dangers posed by the courts' inconsistent
application of the copyright law to the Internet terrain was to provide certain
"safe harbors" 15 5 -to condition the provision of exemptions sought by OSPs 156
upon compliance with procedural safeguards designed to protect the interests of
copyright owners. 157 In Conference Report 796, Congress explained that Title HI
"preserves strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to
cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the
digital networked environment" while also providing "greater certainty to service
providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the
course of their activities." 15 8
Title II amends chapter 5 of the 1976 Act159 to create a new section 512,160
15 3 Id.
154 Id.
155 The DMCA does not represent Congress's first resolution of a debate regarding OSP
liability. See supra note 28.
15 6 For purposes of the three safe harbors embodied in section 202 of the DMCA (to be
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)-(d)), the definition of OSP is extremely broad--"a provider of
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefore." Pub. L. No. 105-304,
§ 202, 112 Stat. 2886 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(l)(B)). For purposes of the
Transitory Communications safe harbor, an OSP is defined as "an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between
or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to
the content of the material as sent or received." Id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(k))(A)).
157 Congress's action directly contradicts the views expressed by many commentators
that such legislation was premature and unnecessary. See, e.g., Cahoy, supra note 15, at 335;
Walton, supra note 105, at 946.
158 HR. CoNF. REP. No. 105-796, at 72 (1998).
159 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-511 (1994).
160 The U.S. Copyright Office noted that The Fairness in Musical Licensing Act, Title II
of Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, 2830-34 (1998), also adds a new section 512 to the
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titled "Limitations on liability relating to material online." 161 Section 512
delineates four general categories 162 of activity for which an OSP's infringement
liability may be limited-transitory communications; 163 system caching; 164
storage of information on systems at the direction of its users; 165 and information
location tools. 166 It is crucial to note that these categories do not provide a litmus
test for determining whether or not a service provider is liable for infringement.
Using existing principles of copyright law, a copyright owner must still prove
that the OSP is liable for direct, contributory, or vicarious infringement.167 The
safe harbors operate as a first line of defense against an infringement claim and
an OSP "may still avail itself of any of the defenses, such as fair use, that are
available to copyright defendants generally."'1 68 Additionally, the infringement
liability of an OSP that does not qualify for a safe harbor will continue to be
interpreted by the existing case law.
OSPs qualifying for any of the liability limitations in subsections (a)-(d) are
shielded from monetary damage awards169 for direct, vicarious, or contributory
Copyright Act. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office
Summary (Dec. 1998) <http://www.loc.gov/copyright>. A technical amendments bill is needed
to correct this duplication. See id.
161 See DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877-86 (to be codified at
17 U.S.C. § 512).
162 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)-(d)).
163 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (a)); infra Part VI.A for further discussion.
164 See DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)); infra Part VI.B for further
discussion.
165 See DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)); infra Part VI.C for further
discussion.
166 See DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)); infra Part VI.D for further
discussion.
167 Conference Report 796 interprets subsection (I) to provide that section 512 "is not
intended to imply that a service provider is or is not liable as an infringer either for conduct that
qualifies for a limitation of liability or for conduct that fails to so qualify." H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 105-796, at 73 (1998). Section 512(1) provides:
The failure of a service provider's conduct to qualify for limitation of liability under this
section shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of a defense by the service
provider that the service provider's conduct is not infringing under this title or any other
defense.
DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(1)). For both a general discussion of copyright
infringement theories and their specific application to the Intemet arena, see supra Parts II.B &
III.
168 U.S. Copyright Office Summary, supra note 160, at 9.
169 Subsection (k)(2) defines "monetary relief' to include "damages, costs, attomeys'
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infringement. Additionally, subsection (j) limits the availability of injunctive
relief against qualifying service providers' 70 However, to qualify for these
protections, service providers must first satisfy the conditions set forth in
subsection (i), "Conditions for Eligibility."'171 Specifically, the OSP must have
adopted and reasonably implemented a policy that terminates the accounts of its
subscribers who are repeat infringers. 172
A. Safe Harbor for Transitory Communications
Section 512(a)173 essentially codifies Netcom,174 limiting the direct
fees, and any other form of monetary payment." DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(k)(2)).
170 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)).
171 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)).
172 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A)). Congress recognized that such a
provision must be feasible and could not have a crippling effect upon the OSPs' business.
Section 512(i)(1)(B) provides that this policy cannot interfere with copyright owners' "standard
technical measures" that are defined to mean measures which copyright owners use to identify
or protect their copyrighted works and "do not impose substantial costs" or "substantial
burdens" on OSPs. See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2)(C)).
173 Section 512(a) provides:
(a) TRANSITORY DIGITAL NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS.-A service provider
shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j) for
injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the
provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a system
or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the
intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such transmitting,
routing, or providing connections, if-
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a person
other than the service provider,
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out
through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by the
service provider,
(3) the service provider does not select the recipients of the material except as an
automatic response to the request of another person;
(4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of such
intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a manner
accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and no such copy is
maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such
anticipated recipients for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the
transmission, routing, or provision of connections; and
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without modification of
its content.
Id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)).
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infringement liability of OSPs for the copyright infingements of third parties
(their subscribers). This section limits the liability of OSPs which act merely as
data conduits, transmitting information at the request of subscribers.
Additionally, this safe harbor includes the intermediate and transitory copies that
are automatically made in the operation of a network. However, in order for an
OSP to qualify for this safe harbor, the transmission must have been initiated by
a person other than the OSP itself;175 the selection of the material must have
occurred through an automatic technical process and not through the direct
selection of the OSP;176 the OSP must not select the recipients of the material;177
intermediate copies must not be retained for longer than is necessary to
accomplish the transmission; 178 and the material must be transmitted without
modification of its content.179
B. Safe Harbor for System Caching
Section 512(b) 180 limits the liability of service providers for system caching,
a process utilized by OSPs to increase the efficiency of their networks. System
caching refers to the process by which an OSP retains a temporary copy of often-
accessed Interet material so that subsequent requests for the material can be
fulfilled by transmitting that retained copy, instead of again retrieving the
174 For a discussion of Netcom, see supra Part III.A.3.
175 See DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1)).
176 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(2)).
177 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(3)).
178 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4)).
179 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(5)).
180 Section 512(b)(1) provides that, subject to the conditions iterated in section 512(b)(2):
... [a] service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or except as provided in
subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by
reason of the intermediate and temporary storage of material on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider in a case in which-
(A) the material is made available online by a person other than the service provider,
(B) the material is transmitted from the person described in subparagraph (A)
through the system or network to a person other than the person described in
subparagraph (A) at the direction of that other person; and
(C) the storage is carried out through an automatic technical process for the purpose
of making the material available to users of the system or network who, after the
material is transmitted as described in subparagraph (B), request access to the
material from the person described in subparagraph (A) ....
Id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)).
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material from the original source.181 The safe harbor applies to material that is
placed online by a person other than the OSP and then is transmitted to a third
party (the subscriber) at his or her request' 82 Additionally, in order to qualify for
the safe harbor, the OSP must not modify the content of the material; 183 must
comply with rules about "refreshing, reloading, or other updating of the material
when specified by the person making the material available online" in
accordance with standard industry practice; 184 must not interfere with the
technology that returns "hit" 185 information to the person who uploaded the
material; 186 must limit subscribers' access to the material in accordance with the
uploader's conditions on access (e.g., payment of a fee or provision of a
password);187 and, if notified by the copyright owner that the original material
from which the "cached" copy was made has been removed or blocked, the OSP
must act "expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infiinging."'188
C. Safe Harbor for Information Residing on Systems or Networks at the
Direction of Users
Section 512(c)189 responds to OSP fears that judicial expansion of Fonovisa
181 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)); U.S. Copyright Office Summary, supra
note 160, at 10.
182 See DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1)(A)-(C)).
183 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(bX2XA)).
184 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(B)).
185 A "hit" denotes that a user has requested material on a website. Advertising revenue is
frequently calculated from such "it" information. See U.S. Copyright Off ce Summary, supra
note 160, at 10.
186 See DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(C)).
187 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(D)).
188 id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E)).
189 Section 512(c)(1) provides that, in general:
... [a] service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in
subsection j) for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by
reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider-
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove,
or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,
1999]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
to the Internet context could result in findings of infringement liability for their
mere provision of "support services." 190 The section limits the contributory 91
and vicarious infringement liability192 of OSPs. To be eligible for the limitation,
the OSP must not have the requisite level of knowledge' 93 of the infringing
activity. 194 Additionally, if the OSP has the right and ability to control 95 the
infinging activity, it must not receive a direct financial benefit 96 from such
activity. 197 Moreover, this section also includes a "notice and take-down"
provision-upon receipt of notification of an alleged infringement, the OSP must
act expeditiously to remove or block access to the material.1 98
In addition, OSPs must designate an agent who, on its behalf, will receive
notification from the copyright owner of a claimed infringement.199 That
designation of agent must be filed with the Copyright Office and must be made
available through the OSP's publicly accessible website.20 0 In November 1998,
the Copyright Office published interim regulations detailing this registration.201
in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity;
and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be
infringing or to be the subject of the infringing activity.
Id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)).
190 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text For a discussion of the ease with
which Fonovisa's broad interpretations of contributory and vicarious infringement liability
could be analogized to the Internet, see supra Part III.D.3.
191 For a discussion of Fonovisa's contributory infringement analysis, see supra Part
11I.D.1.
192 For a discussion of vicarious infringement liability of OSPs, see supra Part Im.C and
accompanying text.
193 For a discussion of knowledge see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
194 See DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii)). Under this
requirement, the OSP is eligible for the safe harbor only if it does not have actual knowledge of
the infringement; or, in the absence of actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances
which make infringing activity apparent; or, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
quickly to remove the infringing material. See id.
195 For a discussion of the control prong, see supra note 101 and accompanying text
196 For a discussion of direct and indirect financial benefits, see supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text.
197 See DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B)).
198 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C)).
199 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2)).
200 See id.
201 See Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement, 63 Fed.
Reg. 59,233 (1998) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201). The Copyright Office will not provide
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Section 512(c) places concurrent duties upon copyright owners, who, under
penalty of perjury, must serve a notice of infringement upon the OSP's
designated agent.202 If a copyright owner fails to substantially comply with the
statutory requirements, the notification will not be considered in determining
whether the OSP had the requisite level of knowledge to qualify for the safe
harbor.203 The OSP is exempt from liability provided that, upon receipt of proper
notification from the copyright owner, the OSP removes or blocks access to the
allegedly infringing material.
Section 512(g)(1) is designed to protect against fraudulent or erroneous
infringement notifications. Once an OSP has received an infringement
notification from a copyright owner, it must promptly notify its subscriber who
uploaded the information that it has removed or disabled access to the
material.204 Then, the subscriber may respond to the notice and take-down by
sending a "counter notification" to the OSP stating that the subscriber has a good
faith belief that the material was removed or blocked as the result of a mistake or
misidentification.205 If the counter notification complies with additional statutory
requirements,206 the OSP must next forward a copy of the counter notification to
the copyright owner.207 If the copyright owner does not notify the OSP that it has
"filed an action seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber from engaging in
infringing activity relating to the material on the [OSP]'s system or network," the
OSP must replace or unblock the material within ten to fourteen business days of
receiving the counter notification.20 8
designation of agent forms, but does provide a suggested format. The registration must be
labeled "Interim Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement." This
form should include the full name and address of the OSP; all names under which the OSP is
doing business; and the name, address, telephone number, fax number, and e-mail of the agent.
The Copyright Office provides a suggested form at its website <http:I/lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/
onlinesp/>. Additionally, a list of agents is maintained at <http:/Acweb.loc.gov.copyright/
onlinesp/list/>.
202 The form and content of the notice is detailed in § 512. See DMCA § 202 (to be
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi)). The notice must be in writing and signed by the
copyright owner or his or her agent. See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii)).
Additionally, it must identify the copyrighted work(s) which allegedly have been infringed. See
id.
203 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(cX3)(BXi)-(ii)).
204 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)).
205 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(gX3)(B)).
20 6 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(gX3XA), (C), (D)).
20 7 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B)).
20 8 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C)).
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D. Safe Harborfor Information Location Tools
Earlier versions of the OSP safe harbors did not clearly indicate which types
of OSPs it would exempt from copyright infringement liability. For example,
House Bill 3209, section 512(f), defined "provider" as a "provider of on-line
services or network access."20 9 This definition could have been interpreted by
courts to exclude "logical access providers," including web search engines210
such as Lycos,211 Altavista,2 12 and Infoseek213 and directory pages214 like
Yahoo215 and Magellan.2 16 Section 512(d)217 of the DMCA removes the
209 See On-Line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, H.R. 3209, § 2, 105th
Cong. (1998).
210 Web search engines create an index file of a large number of web pages, which is
constantly regenerated to reflect additions of and alterations to web pages. A user submits a
search request of keywords, and the search engine scans the index and returns a list of
matching web pages and their hyperlinks, which allows a user to directly access the pages. See
Levi, supra note 16, at 561.
211 Lycos's Internet address is <http://www.lycos.com>.
2 12 Altavista's Internet address is <http-l/www.altavista.digital.com>.
2 13 Infoseek's Internet address is <http://www.infoseek.com>.
214 Directory pages cover a smaller amount of web pages than do web search engines, but
they allow an Internet user to focus more narrowly on a topic. Yahoo! and Magellan act as
registries of web pages and their hyperlinks organized by topic. They are arranged in a format
to allow users to easily find information and may include a description of the web page and a
rating system. See Levi, supra note 16, at 561-62.
2 15 Yahoo!'s Internet address is <http//www.yahoo.comi>.
216 Magellan's Internet address is <http://Wwww.magellan.con>.
217 Section 512(d) provides:
INFORMATION LOCATION TOOLS.-A service provider shall not be liable for
monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable
relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to
an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using
information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext
link, if the service provider-
(1)(A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or activity is infringing;
(B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which the infringing activity is apparent; or
(C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove
or disable access to the material;
(2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,
in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activitr,
and
(3) upon notification of the claimed infringement as described in subsection (c)(3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be
infringing or be the subject of infringing activity, except that, for purposes of this
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possibility for inconsistent application by specifically limiting the liability of
logical access providers. In order to qualify for the safe harbor, the OSP must
meet essentially the same requirements imposed by the safe harbor for
information residing on systems or networks. 218 Specifically, the OSP must not
have the requisite level of knowledge that the material is infringing;219 if the
OSP has the right and ability to control the infringing activity, it must not receive
a direct financial benefit directly attributable to the activity;220 and upon notice
that the material is infringing, it must expeditiously remove or block access to
the material.221 Prior to enactment of the DMCA, courts had yet to consider
whether these logical access providers should be found liable for copyright
infiingement for using a hyperlink to direct a user to a web page containing
infringing material.222
paragraph, the infomation described in subsection (cX3XAXiii) shall be identification of
the reference or link, to material or activity claimed to be infringing, that is to be removed
or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the
service provider to locate that reference or link.
DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2881 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(d)).
2 18 See supra Part VI.C.
219 See DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(A)-(C)). This knowledge
standard is the same as that under the safe harbor for information residing on systems or
networks. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
220 See DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(2)).
221 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3)).
222 See Levi, supra note 16, at 562. Applying the Netcom analysis, it is highly unlikely
that logical access providers would have been found liable for direct copyright infringement
because no actual copying is performed. As to contributory infringement liability, it is unlikely
that a court would have found a search engine like Lycos or Yahoo! liable. See id. at 563. In
determining whether a search engine could be found liable for contributory infringement, the
relevant inquiry would be: "Does its activity in establishing a hyperlink rise to the level of
'substantial' participation in the direct infringement of another?" Such search engines would
argue that they are merely making available a search engine which would find all web pages
meeting the searcher's criteria. The search engine operates without human intervention and
makes "automatic and indiscriminate" responses to a searcher's criteria. Thus, the search
engine operator would argue that it is technically unfeasible to only return a search result
consisting of pages which do not contain any infringing material. See id. at 563-64.
Directory pages providers, on the other hand, might have been found liable for
contributory infringement if they provide a hypertext link to a web page that they know
contains infiinging content. In compiling their service, directory page providers take steps
which may rise to the level of "substantial" participation. Directory page providers either
search the Web themselves or solicit requests for web pages to be included in their directory.
Additionally, directory pages often rate various web pages after scanning their contents.
Further, it may be alleged that the directory provider's efforts in making an infringing web
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E. Safe Harbor for Nonprofit Educational Institutions
Public and nonprofit institutions such as libraries and universities most likely
fall within the DMCA's definition of "OSP." Section 512(e)223 determines when
the actions of a faculty member or graduate student employed by the institution
may affect the institution's eligibility for the four safe harbors detailed above.224
For the purposes of sections 512(a) and (b), the transitory communications and
system caching safe harbors, such faculty member or graduate student is
considered a "person other than the provider" so that the institution will not be
disqualified from eligibility for the safe harbors. For the purposes of section
512(c) and (d), the safe harbors for information residing on systems or networks
at the direction of users and information location tools, the knowledge of a
faculty member or graduate student that material is infinging will not be
imputed to the institution provided that several conditions are met. Those
conditions include that the faculty member's or graduate student's activities do
not involve providing online access to course materials that were required or
recommended during the preceding three year period for a course taught by such
individual;225 that the institution has not received more than two section
page more accessible aids the primary infringer's purpose in distributing the works. See id. at
564-65.
223 Section 512(e) provides:
(1) When a public or other nonprofit institution of higher education is a service provider,
and when a faculty member or graduate student who is an employee of such institution is
performing a teaching or research function, for the purposes of subsections (a) and (b)
such faculty member or graduate student shall be considered to be a person other than the
institution, and for the purposes of subsections (c) and (d) such faculty member's or
graduate student's knowledge or awareness of his or her infringing activities shall not be
attributed to the institution, if-
(A) such faculty member's or graduate student's infringing activities do not involve
the provision of online access to instructional materials that are or were required or
recommended, within the preceding 3-year period, for a course taught at the institution by
such faculty member or graduate student;
(B) the institution has not, within the preceding 3-year period, received more than
two notifications described in subsection (c)(3) of claimed infringement by such faculty
member or graduate student, and such notifications of claimed infringement were not
actionable under subsection (f); and
(C) the institution provides to all users of its system or network informational
materials that accurately describe, and promote compliance with, the laws of the United
States relating to copyright
DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(e)).
22 4 See id.
22 5 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(e)(1)(A)).
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512(c)(3) notifications during the preceding three year period that the faculty
member or graduate student was infringing; 226 and that the institution provides
all users of its system with materials that describe and promote compliance with
copyright law.227
VII. CONCLUSION
Returning to the question posed in the introduction--"once online copyright
infringement is alleged, the question becomes-whom should the copyright
owner seek to hold liable?" 228 If an OSP is protected by the safe harbors of the
DMCA, the owner of the allegedly infringed copyright may well have no choice
but to proceed against the direct infringer, the user of the OSP's services.
However, as previously noted, it may be difficult to pinpoint the identity of the
direct infringer. In order to aid the copyright owner, Title II establishes a
procedure by which a copyright owner can obtain a subpoena from a federal
court that orders an OSP to disclose the identity of the alleged direct infringer.229
Another question-What if the copyright owner locates the direct infringer, who
has no pockets of which to speak, and the deep pocket OSP is protected by a safe
harbor? Then, it appears, the copyright owner's only remedy may be injunctive
relief.
The DMCA attempts to balance the interests of copyright owners and OSPs
while ensuring the continued growth of the Internet by conditioning a statutory
exemption upon OSP compliance with various procedural safeguards. It removes
the uncertainty created by Fonovisa, Playboy, and Sega I and ensures that OSPs
have the incentive to make their subscribers more aware of copyright law and to
react promptly when informed that infringing material resides on their systems.
Perhaps the crisis for OSPs has been solved, but the crisis for copyright
owners-that the Internet provides a cheap and universal medium for the
unauthorized copying and distribution of their works, for which damages cannot
be recovered-remains.2 30
This Note purports only briefly to outline the manner in which the DMCA
addresses OSP concerns. The rules of the OSP safe harbors are complex and
require strict adherence to detail. If an OSP fails to fully comply with the
provisions of the Act, it risks loss of the limitations on liability and potentially
large damage awards under the various theories of infiingement liability.
226 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(e)(1)(B)).
227 See id. (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(e)(1)(C)).
228 Supra Part I.
229 See DMCA § 202 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)).
230 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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However, the full impact of the Act remains unknown, as the courts have yet to
address a case in which an OSP claims it qualifies for one of the DMCA safe
harbors.
